I’m a PhD student in economics at the Goethe University Frankfurt. My research focuses on the theoretical and empirical analysis of labor markets with assortative matching. I try to understand the effects of automation and globalization on labor markets and the role of firm networks for the transmission of information.


Automation, Globalization and Vanishing Jobs: A Labor Market Sorting View, July 2019

joint with Ester Faia, Sebastien Laffitte and Gianmarco Ottaviano

Show Abstract We show, theoretically and empirically, that the effects of technological change associated with automation and offshoring on the labor market can substantially deviate from standard neoclassical conclusions when search frictions hinder efficient assortative matching between firms with heterogeneous tasks and workers with heterogeneous skills. Our key hypothesis is that better matches enjoy a comparative advantage in exploiting automation and a comparative disadvantage in exploiting offshoring. It implies that automation (offshoring) may reduce (raise) employment by lengthening (shortening) unemployment duration due to higher (lower) match selectivity. We find empirical support for this implication in a dataset covering 92 occupations and 16 sectors in 13 European countries from 1995 to 2010.

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The Value of Firm Networks: A Natural Experiment on Board Connections, April 2020

joint with Ester Faia and Vincenzo Pezone

Show Abstract This paper presents causal evidence of the effects of boardroom networks on firm value and compensation policies. We exploit exogenous variation in network centrality arising from a ban on interlocking directorates of Italian financial and insurance companies. We leverage this shock to show that firms whose centrality in the network rises after the reform experience positive abnormal returns around the announcement date and are better hedged against shocks. Information dissemination plays a central role: results are driven by firms that have higher idiosyncratic volatility, low analyst coverage, and more uncertainty surrounding their earnings forecasts. Firms benefit more from boardroom centrality when they are more central in the input-output network, hence more susceptible to upstream shocks, when they are less central in the cross-ownership network, or when they have low profitability or low growth opportunities. Network centrality also results in higher directors' compensation, due to rent sharing and improved executives' outside option, and more similar compensation policies between connected firms.

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Global Banking: Endogenous Competition and Risk Taking, January 2020

joint with Ester Faia, Sebastien Laffitte and Gianmarco Ottaviano
accepted European Economic Review

Show Abstract When banks expand abroad, their riskiness decreases if foreign expansion happens in destination countries that are more competitive than their origin countries. We reach this conclusion in three steps. First, we develop a flexible dynamic model of global banking with endogenous competition and endogenous risk-taking. Sec- ond, we calibrate and simulate the model to generate empirically relevant predic- tions. Third, we validate these predictions by testing them on an original dataset covering the activities of the 15 European global systemically important banks (G- SIBs). Our results hold across alternative measures of individual and systemic bank risk.



Maximilian Mayer
Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany
House of Finance, Theodor-W.- Adorno Platz 3, 60323
Office 3.43
Frankfurt am Main
+49 (69) 798 33800